工业工程 ›› 2024, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (1): 128-136.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.230090

• 供应链管理与决策 • 上一篇    下一篇

模仿产品竞争威胁下供应链独家采购合作研究

刘达, 赵旭东, 王晟嫣   

  1. 华北电力大学 经济与管理学院,北京 102206
  • 收稿日期:2023-06-19 发布日期:2024-03-05
  • 通讯作者: 赵旭东 (1999—),男,河北省人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理。Email:jianlano@163.com E-mail:jianlano@163.com
  • 作者简介:刘达 (1977—),男,湖北省人,教授,博士,主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理
  • 基金资助:
    国家重点研发计划资助项目 (2020YFB1707800)

Exclusive Procurement Cooperation in Supply Chains under the Threat of Imitated Product Competition

LIU Da, ZHAO Xudong, WANG Shengyan   

  1. School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
  • Received:2023-06-19 Published:2024-03-05

摘要: 为了探究模仿产品竞争背景下品牌制造商与零售商能否达成独家采购合作,构建原创品牌制造商、模仿者和零售商三方组成的两阶段Stackelberg博弈模型;对比了零售商引入模仿产品对其自身及品牌商利润的影响;求解了品牌商折扣让利情形下品牌商与零售商达成独家采购合作的边界条件。研究结果表明:1)不考虑品牌商的折扣让利时,零售商引入模仿产品总是会提升自身利润,降低品牌商利润,但是品牌商的创新产品需求量会逆势增加;2)当零售商担任博弈领导者时,如果品牌商愿意给予零售商一定批发价格折扣,品牌商与零售商都能从独家采购合作中实现帕累托改进,该折扣水平阈值与模仿产品质量、品牌商忠实消费者比例相关;3)品牌商担任博弈领导者时,品牌商与零售商并不能从独家采购合作中实现帕累托改进。

关键词: 模仿产品, 独家采购, 品牌制造商, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: In order to study whether brand manufacturers and retailers can achieve exclusive procurement cooperation in the context of imitated product competition, a two-stage Stackelberg game model composed of original brand manufacturers, imitators and retailers is established. The influence of introducing imitated products by retailers on the profits of retailer themself and brand manufacturers is compared, while the boundary conditions for exclusive procurement cooperation between brand manufacturers and retailers in the condition that brand manufacturers give discounts are solved. Results show that: 1) without taking into account the discounts given by brand manufacturers, introducing imitated products by retailers always improves the retailer profits and reduces the brand manufacturer profits, but the demand of brand manufacturers for innovative products increases against the trend; 2) when retailers are game leaders, if brand manufacturers agree to give retailers a wholesale price discount, both brand manufacturers and retailers can realize Pareto improvement in exclusive procurement cooperation, and this discount level threshold is correlated to the quality of imitated products as well as the proportion of loyal consumers of brand manufacturers; 3) when brand manufacturers are game leaders, neither brand manufacturers nor retailers can realize Pareto improvement in exclusive procurement cooperation.

Key words: imitate products, exclusive procurement, brand manufacturer, Stackelberg game

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