政府奖惩机制下港口危化品物流监管的三方演化博弈研究

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.230012

工业工程 ›› 2024, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (1): 137-144,154.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.230012

政府奖惩机制下港口危化品物流监管的三方演化博弈研究

李煜^1,2, 王腾飞¹, 周欢¹, 刘景森³

1. 河南大学商学院;
2. 管理科学与工程研究所;
3. 复杂智能网络系统研究所，河南开封 475004

收稿日期:2023-01-11 发布日期:2024-03-05
通讯作者: 周欢 (1990—)，女，河南省人，讲师，博士，主要研究方向为物流风险管理。Email: zhouhuan@henu.edu.cn E-mail:zhouhuan@henu.edu.cn
作者简介:李煜 (1969—)，女，河南省人，教授，博士，主要研究方向为物流管理、智能算法及电子商务
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目 (72104069)；河南省重点研发与推广转型资助项目 (182102310886)；河南大学研究生教育创新与质量提升资助项目 (SYL19060145)

A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study on Port Logistics Regulation of Hazardous Chemicals with Government Reward and Punishment Mechanisms

LI Yu^1,2, WANG Tengfei¹, ZHOU Huan¹, LIU Jingsen³

1. School of Business;
2. Institute of Management Science and Engineering;
3. Institute of Intelligent Network Systems, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004, China

Received:2023-01-11 Published:2024-03-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为解决物流监管中企业向第三方专业机构寻租、政府监管缺失等问题，构建港口物流企业、第三方专业机构和港口行政管理部门的三方演化博弈模型，通过求解与数值仿真，揭示物流监管中演化均衡规律。研究表明，港口行政管理部门设定的奖惩机制必须符合对各方的奖励与惩罚之和大于各自投机收益的条件，才能使策略组合 (合规运营、拒绝寻租、宽松监管) 成为演化稳定策略；增大奖励与惩罚力度均有利于企业合规运营和第三方专业机构拒绝寻租策略的实施，但港政部门的监管意愿随着奖励力度的增大而减小，且随着奖励力度的增大其效果减弱；提升企业的信誉收益，增加寻租成本及政府失职受到的问责也有助于促进企业向合规运营方向的演化。

关键词: 港口危险化学品, 第三方专业机构, 寻租行为, 演化博弈, 仿真分析

Abstract: In order to solve the problem of enterprises seeking rent from third-party professional organizations and lacking government supervision in logistics regulation, a tripartite evolutionary game model is established with port logistics enterprises, third-party professional organizations and port administrative departments. The evolutionary equilibrium law in logistics regulation is revealed through model solving and numerical simulation. Results show that the reward and punishment set by port administrative departments must satisfy the condition that the sum of reward and punishment for each party is greater than its respective speculative gain such that the combination of strategies (compliant operation, rejection of rent-seeking, and loose regulation) can be a stable evolutionary strategy; increasing the intensity of both reward and punishment is beneficial to the compliant operation of enterprises and also the implementation of third-party professional organizations to reject rent-seeking strategies, however, as the reward intensity increases, the supervision willingness of port administrative departments decreases, also its effect weakens; the evolution of enterprises toward compliant operation can be facilitated by improving the reputation gain of enterprises, increasing rent-seeking costs and the accountability for government failures.

Key words: port hazardous chemicals, third-party professional organizations, rent-seeking behavior, evolutionary game, simulation analysis

中图分类号:

李煜, 王腾飞, 周欢, 刘景森. 政府奖惩机制下港口危化品物流监管的三方演化博弈研究[J]. 工业工程, 2024, 27(1): 137-144,154.

LI Yu, WANG Tengfei, ZHOU Huan, LIU Jingsen. A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study on Port Logistics Regulation of Hazardous Chemicals with Government Reward and Punishment Mechanisms[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2024, 27(1): 137-144,154.

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政府奖惩机制下港口危化品物流监管的三方演化博弈研究

A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study on Port Logistics Regulation of Hazardous Chemicals with Government Reward and Punishment Mechanisms

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