关键词: Stackelberg博弈, 政府补贴, 零售商扶贫努力, 企业社会责任

Abstract: In order to study the supply chain support decisions of the government and retailers for agricultural products, three contract farming support models are established considering government production subsidies and retailer investment in poverty alleviation efforts, including the government subsidy model (GS model), the retailer poverty alleviation model (RH model), and the government-retailer joint support model (GR model). Through the comparative analysis of profit relationships and profit increment of each party in the three models, the optimal support decisions of the government and retailers are obtained. Results show that if the government provides production subsidies only to high-cost farmers, it is necessary for retailers to devote poverty alleviation efforts. Conversely, if retailers invest in poverty alleviation efforts for all farmers, the government should then provide production subsidies. Retailers poverty alleviation programs can consistently benefit all farmers. In a consumer-sensitive market, government subsidies provided later can benefit all farmers. In addition, in a market with low consumer sensitivity, the government needs to subsidize first, followed by retailer investment in poverty alleviation efforts. In a consumer-sensitive market, retailers are required to invest in poverty alleviation efforts first, followed by government subsidies.

Key words: Stackelberg game, government subsidies, retailer poverty alleviation efforts, corporate social responsibility