工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2011, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (6): 22-26.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于生产管理系统可靠性因素的激励模型

  

  1. 1.贵州大学 理学院，贵州 贵阳 550025;2.华南理工大学 工商管理学院，广东 广州 510640
  • 出版日期:2011-12-31 发布日期:2011-12-23

Incentive Analysis under Principal Agent Environment with Quantified Reliability Factor for the Production and Management Systems

  1.  1. College of Science, Guizhou University, Guizhou 550025, China;
    2. School of Business and Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, China
  • Online:2011-12-31 Published:2011-12-23

摘要：  假定企业生产与管理系统运作可靠性这一内部因素已经被量化，在此基础上描述了非对称信息条件下企业经营者的激励模型。通过对模型最优解的分析以及非对称信息问题的贝叶斯分析，讨论了观测力度对企业经营者努力水平、激励水平、风险成本和代理成本等的影响。研究结论表明，观测带来了自然状态方差的下降；随着委托者观测力度的增加，经营者减少了消极怠工的机会，同时得到了更高水平的激励；除去观测成本这一因素，委托人对企业经营者的观测节约了总的代理成本。

关键词: 可靠性, 委托代理理论, 信息不对称, 贝叶斯分析

Abstract: The incentive mechanism is discussed for the principalagent environment. It is assumed that the reliability of the production and management systems in an enterprise is a general information system and the correlative reliability indexes are quantified. A mathematical model is developed to describe the incentive mechanism with the influence of uncertainty factor and information asymmetry taken into account. This model describes the relation between the effectiveness and the observation levels. Based on this model, by using Baysian theory under the asymmetrical information, analysis is carried out to show the effect of different observation level on agent"s effort, risky cost, incentive sharing rate and agency cost, etc. Results show that high level observation can promote the incentive and reduce the cost.    

Key words: reliability, principal-agent theory, information asymmetry, Baysian theory