工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2012, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (3): 24-28.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于双边道德风险的逆向供应链回收激励契约

  

  1. 重庆大学 经济与工商管理学院，重庆400030
  • 出版日期:2012-06-30 发布日期:2012-07-21
  • 作者简介:胡新平（1953-），男，重庆市人，副教授，主要研究方向为组织行为和人力资源管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目（70872121）

Incentive Recycling Contracts with Double Moral Hazard in Reverse Supply Chain

  1. College of Economics & Business Administration，Chongqing University，Chongqing 400030，China
  • Online:2012-06-30 Published:2012-07-21

摘要： 针对制造商和零售商共同努力回收废旧品过程中的双边道德风险问题，引入努力弹性系数，运用委托代理理论，设计了一个基于双边道德风险的线性契约。理论和数值分析结果表明，制造商和零售商努力水平之比和边际利润之比均等于二者努力效率之比，零售商固定费用与制造商努力效率成正比，与产出系数负相关，与努力成本系数正相关。因此，制造商和零售商应根据努力弹性系数决定努力水平，制造商在制定价格合同时，应当充分考虑回收产出和努力成本等因素，最大程度地消除双边道德风险对逆向供应链系统效率的影响，以提高逆向供应链整体绩效。

关键词: 双边道德风险, 逆向供应链, 激励契约

Abstract: The double moral hazard problem in a reverse supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer for used product recycling is discussed. To solve this problem, a linear contract is designed by using the principalagent theory and effort elastic coefficient. With this contract, theoretical analysis and numerical simulation are carried out. It is found that the ratio of effort level of the manufacturer to that of the retailer, the ratio of effort efficiency of the manufacturer to that of the retailer, and the ratio of marginal profit of the manufacturer to that of the retailer are equal to each other. Also, the retailers fixed cost increases as the manufacturers effort efficiency and effort cost coefficient increase, while it decreases as the manufacturers output coefficient increases. Thus, manufacturer and retailers effort level should be decided according to the corresponding effort elastic coefficient. When price contract is designed, it should take the effort elastic coefficient, output coefficient, and effort cost factor into full consideration so as to eliminate the impact of double moral hazard.

Key words: double moral hazard, reverse supply chain, incentive contract