考虑公平偏好的两级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对供应链中存在的公平偏好问题，构建了一个考虑公平偏好的两级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型。通过引入参照点效应建立公平偏好效用函数，分析了仅零售商具有公平偏好、仅供应商具有公平偏好和二者均具有公平偏好3种情况下公平偏好对供应链均衡策略的影响。研究结果表明：公平偏好改变了销售收益分享率和零售商的努力水平，影响供应商和零售商的效用值，并且公平偏好程度越大，对双方效用的影响越明显。

关键词: 供应链, 公平偏好, Stackelberg博弈, 行为运作

Abstract: Fairness preference has significant effect on the operation in a supply chain. With fairness preference taken into account in this paper, a Stackelberg game model is developed for a two-level supply chain. Further, utility functions are established by introducing reference point effect. Then the effect of fairness on the supply chain partners strategies is analyzed for three cases: the retailer concerns about fairness only, the supplier concerns about fairness only, and both partners concern about fairness. Results show that fairness preference changes the revenue sharing rate and the retailers effort level. Also, fairness preference influences partners utility values in a supply chain, and the greater the fairness degree is, the more obvious the influence is.

Key words: supply chain； fairness preference； Stackelberg game, behavioral operation

王勇, 朱龙涛. 考虑公平偏好的两级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型[J]. 工业工程, 2012, 15(4): 28-34.

Wang Yong, Zhu Long-tao. Stackelberg Game Model for Two-Level Supply Chain with Fairness Preference[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2012, 15(4): 28-34.

参考文献

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