基于委托代理框架双重信息不对称下回收商激励机制

工业工程 ›› 2012, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (4): 53-57.

基于委托代理框架双重信息不对称下回收商激励机制

(1.江苏大学工商管理学院,江苏镇江 212013; 2.盐城工学院经济管理学院，江苏盐城 224001)

出版日期:2012-08-31 发布日期:2012-09-19
作者简介:徐红(1970-),女,江苏省人,讲师,博士研究生,主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理.
基金资助:
教育部人文社科基金资助项目（10YJA630043）

Principal-Agent-Based Recycling Incentive Mechanism with Double Information Asymmetry

(1. School of Business Administration, Jiangsu University, Zhengjiang 212013,China； 2. School of Management and Economics, Yancheng Institute of Technology, Yancheng 224001,China)

Online:2012-08-31 Published:2012-09-19

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对双重信息不对称问题，从制造商视角研究如何设计一套有效的激励机制。以博弈论为基本工具，运用委托代理理论和信号甄别原理，在传统的激励契约模型基础上，考虑回收商投入一定比例的资金，从而构建一种新的激励机制模型，借助模型求解并进行了分析。研究的结果表明：回收商投入的个人资本金与其努力水平呈正相关关系，即回收商的个人资本金投入越多，越能激发回收商的工作热情，他越愿意付出更多的努力水平；回收能力越强的回收商越愿意选择需要承担较大风险的契约，从而有利于制造商更好地抉择。

关键词: 逆向选择, 道德风险, 委托代理理论, 激励机制

Abstract: A supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a recycler with double information asymmetry is discussed. In such a supply chain, the manufacturer acts as principal and the recycler as agent. In this supply chain, as an agent, the recycler makes a part of investment. The objective is to explore an effective incentive mechanism in the manufacturer's perspective. By using game theory, a new model for this problem is developed by modifying the traditional model of incentive mechanism. With this model, analysis is done. It shows that the investment made by the recycler and its recycling efforts positively correlated, or the more the recycler invests, the more recycling enthusiasm of the recycler can be incited. Also, the recycler with greater recycling capability is willing to bear more risk. Thus, in decision making, the manufacturer should take these factors into account.

Key words: adverse selection, moral hazard, principal-agent theory, incentive mechanism

徐红1,2, 施国洪1, 贡文伟1. 基于委托代理框架双重信息不对称下回收商激励机制[J]. 工业工程, 2012, 15(4): 53-57.

Xu Hong1,2，Shi Guo-hong1，Gong Wen-wei1. Principal-Agent-Based Recycling Incentive Mechanism with Double Information Asymmetry[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2012, 15(4): 53-57.

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