工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2012, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (4): 102-107.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

联合投资下创业机构间道德风险的博弈分析

  

  1. （重庆大学 经济与工商管理学院，重庆 400044）
  • 出版日期:2012-08-31 发布日期:2012-09-19
  • 作者简介:曹国华（1967-），男，安徽省人，教授，博士生导师，主要研究方向为金融工程、创业投资.
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金资助项目（08BJY154）；中央高校基本科研资助项目（CDJXS11021113）

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Moral Hazard under Syndication in Venture Capital Institutions

  1. （School of Economics and Business Administration Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China）
  • Online:2012-08-31 Published:2012-09-19

摘要： 联合投资是创业投资最流行的方式之一，针对创业投资机构在采取联合投资模式时可能出现的道德风险——“搭便车”现象，通过构造演化博弈模型，分析两类创业投资机构动态演化的过程，寻找出在不同条件下创业投资机构的演化稳定策略，结果表明创业投资机构的“搭便车”行为是由于即期博弈中收益与成本的对比关系引致的，管理成本以及在投资中所占的比例即股权份额直接影响了联合投资参与者是否会出现道德风险。最后通过控制参数和优化条件提出解决道德风险问题的建议，使联合投资朝着良性循环方向发展。

关键词: 关键词： , 联合投资； 演化博弈； 道德风险； 演化稳定策略（ESS）

Abstract: Syndication is the most widely spread way of venture capital. Under syndication, often “free rider”, a phenomenon of moral hazard, occurs. By addressing this phenomenon, in order to obtain stably evolutionary strategies under different conditions, an evolutionary game model is developed for this problem. With this model, the evolutionary dynamics between two kinds of venture capital institutions is analyzed. It is found that the “free rider” behavior is caused by the ratio between the profit and cost in the current game. It also shows that management costs and the proportion of investment, the so called equity share, have significant effect on the occurrence of moral hazard. Thus, this problem can be resolved by controlling the parameters and improving the conditions. Based on the results obtained, suggestions are made for solving the problem and managing the development of syndication towards a virtuous circle.

Key words: syndication, evolutionary game, moral hazard, evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)