基于博弈理论的供应链信任稳定演化策略

工业工程 ›› 2015, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (5): 81-86.

基于博弈理论的供应链信任稳定演化策略

（桂林电子科技大学商学院，广西桂林 541004）

出版日期:2015-10-31 发布日期:2016-03-24
作者简介:张学龙（1978-），男，山东省人，副教授，博士,主要研究方向为供应链管理、工业工程、决策分析等.
基金资助:
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目（11YJC630290）；广西哲学社会科学“十二五”规划研究课题（13FGL011）

A Research on Stable Evolutionary Strategy of-Supply Chain Trust Based on Game Theory

(School of Business, Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin 541004, China)

Online:2015-10-31 Published:2016-03-24

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 考虑供应链信任演化3个不同阶段，研究供应链信任稳定演化策略。针对传统博弈的局限性，从约束机制不健全和约束机制健全两个层面进行分析，将企业选择信任的额外收益、单方面信任成本、单方面不信任额外收益、单方面不信任代价和单方面信任额外补偿引入到演化博弈矩阵中，利用演化博弈理论分析各阶段的稳定状态。为验证模型的有效性和可行性，通过数值分析，研究模型的演化动力变化，得出相应的系统相图。研究结果表明,供应链信任策略值的概率大于0.75时，合作达到稳态，供应链整体收益最大；约束机制不健全下的稳定演化策略明显优于传统博弈下的稳定演化策略，但是约束机制不健全，企业的稳定演化策略未必都是信任；供应链企业间需要健全约束机制，当约束机制健全时，信任是企业最终策略选择。

关键词: 供应链信任, 演化博弈, 稳定演化策略

Abstract: Considering three different evolutionary stages of supply chain trust, their stable evolutionary strategies are studied. Aiming at the limitation of the traditional game, sound and unsound constraint mechanism are taken into account. Bringing the extra incomes trusted by both enterprises, costs of unilateral trust, extra revenues of unilateral distrust, costs of unilateral distrust and additional compensation of unilateral trust into the matrix of evolutionary game, stable evolutionary strategy of every stage is analyzed by using the evolutionary game theory. In order to validate the feasibility and effectiveness of the model, the numbers are analyzed, the changes of dynamics about the evolution of models researched into, and then corresponding systematic diagram worked out. The results show that cooperation achieves steady state and supply chain overall income is maximal when the probability of supply chain trust is greater than 0.75, and the stable evolutionary strategy which is under the unsound restraint mechanism is superior to that under the traditional one. But when restraint mechanism is unsound, not all the stable evolutionary strategies of enterprises are trustable. So it is imperative to improve the constraint mechanism, by which, when sound, the steady evolutionary strategy of enterprise can be finally trustable.

Key words: supply chain trust, evolutionary game, stable evolutionary strategy 

张学龙, 王军进. 基于博弈理论的供应链信任稳定演化策略[J]. 工业工程, 2015, 18(5): 81-86.

Zhang Xue-long, Wang Jun-jin. A Research on Stable Evolutionary Strategy of-Supply Chain Trust Based on Game Theory[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2015, 18(5): 81-86.

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