不同市场结构下绿色闭环供应链决策分析

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为了分析不同市场结构对绿色闭环供应链成员决策以及绩效的影响，引入环保参数，采用Stackelberg博弈法，比较了三种市场结构下渠道成员的决策、利润和渠道总利润。研究结果表明：制造商主导市场时批发价、零售价和制造商利润最高；零售商领导市场时回收水平、单位利润和零售商利润最高；环保水平和渠道总利润在垂直纳什市场结构下最高。理论上无领导者的垂直纳什结构最理想，但考虑实际情况，零售商控制市场时较好。

关键词: 绿色闭环供应链, Stackelberg博弈, 不同市场结构, 环保

Abstract:

In order to analyse the impacts of different market structures on decisions and performances of green closedloop supply chain members, by introducing the parameter of environmental conservation, Stackelberg Game theory is adopted to compare the decisions and benefits of channel members, and the total benefits of the whole supply chain in three different market structures. The results show that the unit wholesale price and retail price, and the benefit of manufacturer are highest when manufacturer is market leader. The return rate and unit profit of marketing, and retailer′s benefit are highest when retailer is leader. The environmental conservation level and total profit of the supply chain are highest under the Vertical Nash structure. Theoretically, the Vertical Nash structure is the best, but retailer dominating the market is a better choice in the actual situation.

Key words: green closedloop supply chain, Stackelberg game, different market structures, environmental conservation

梁喜1,马春梅2. 不同市场结构下绿色闭环供应链决策分析[J]. 工业工程.

LIANG Xi1, MA Chunmei2. An Analysis of Decisions of Green Closedloop Supply Chain in Different Market Structures[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal .

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