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不同公平关切下的供应链定价决策分析

  

  1. 1.重庆第二师范学院 生物与化学工程系，重庆 400067；2.重庆理工大学 管理学院，重庆 400054
  • 出版日期:2016-04-30 发布日期:2016-05-27
  • 作者简介:林强（1988-），男，河南省人，硕士，主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理.
  • 基金资助:

    重庆市教委科学技术研究资助项目（KJ1400909）

Pricing Decisions of Supply Chain under Different Fairness Concern

  1. 1. School of Biological and Chemical Engineering, Chongqing University of Education, Chongqing 400067, China; 2.College of Management, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, China
  • Online:2016-04-30 Published:2016-05-27

摘要：

为了比较研究零售商绝对公平关切和相对公平关切下供应链的定价策略与利润，建立一对一两级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型，采用逆推法进行求解。数理推导结果表明：两种公平关切模型下，零售商的公平关切均不会影响其定价策略，但会削弱制造商的批发价格，从而导致零售商获取更多的供应链利润；另外，受零售商公平关切程度的影响，两种公平关切下制造商的批发价格及双方利润表现出明显的分段差异性。

关键词: 公平关切, 供应链, 定价决策, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract:

In order to compare the pricing strategies and profits in a two-level supply chain based on absolute fairness concern and relative fairness concern of the retailer, the Stackelberg game model is established. Then, the optimal pricing strategies and profits are obtained through the converse solution method. The results show that the retailer’s fairness concern does not affect his pricing strategy, but will weaken the manufacturer’s wholesale price under two fairness concern situations. Therefore, the retailer gets more profit of supply chain than in fairness neutral situation. In addition，influenced by the retailer’s fairness concern level, the manufacturer’s wholesale price and the members’ profits show obvious segmented differences under two fairness concern situations.

Key words: fairness concern, supply chain, pricingdecision, Stackelberg game