工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2016, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (3): 1-6.

• 专题论述 •    下一篇

考虑品牌推广补贴的农产品供应链收益共享契约

  

  1. 重庆交通大学1.经济与管理学院；2.图书馆，重庆 400074
  • 出版日期:2016-06-30 发布日期:2016-08-31
  • 作者简介:陈军(1979-)，男，四川省人，副教授，博士，主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301179)；教育部人文社科基金资助项目(13YJC630009；14YJC630034)；中国博士后基金资助项目(2014M562311)；重庆市自然科学基金资助项目(cstc2013jcyjA0998)

RevenueSharing Contract of AgriFood Supply Chain under Brand Promotion Subsidy

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management； 2. Library， Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China
  • Online:2016-06-30 Published:2016-08-31

摘要：

龙头企业单方进行农产品品牌推广的动力不足。据此，考虑政府对龙头企业进行品牌推广提供财政补贴，建立政府和供应链成员的序贯博弈模型，求解出最优补贴比例和推广努力水平。在此基础上，研究了促成农产品供应链协调的两级农产品供应链收益共享契约。研究表明，政府补贴能够同时改善供应链绩效和社会福利，但是政府提供补贴下单纯的收益共享契约不能促成农产品供应链协调，而基于推广成本分担的收益共享契约能够促成农产品供应链协调。

关键词: 供应链, 品牌农产品, 收益共享契约, 财政补贴

Abstract:

 As leading enterprises, by themselves, lack strength in agrifood brand promotion, a sequential game model among the government and the supply chain members is developed under the assumption that the government grants financial subsidy supporting brand promotion. Two parameters of optimal subsidy proportion and promotion effort are obtained; subsequently the revenuesharing contract in twolevel agrifood supply chain is studied. The conclusion shows that both supply chain performance and social welfare are improved under financial subsidy and that revenuesharing contract based on promotion cost share, rather than merely revenuesharing contract, can coordinate supply chain.
 

Key words: supply chain, brand agricultural products, revenuesharing contract, financial subsidy