工业工程

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违约情形下的信用保单质押融资

  

  1. (太原科技大学 经济与管理学院,山西 太原 030024)
  • 出版日期:2016-08-30 发布日期:2016-10-08
  • 作者简介: 高乾(1990-),男,河南省人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为供应链金融.
  • 基金资助:

     国家自然科学基金青年科学基金资助项目(71402112);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(14YJCZH153);山西省高校哲学社会科学研究资助项目(2014247);太原科技大学博士科研启动资助项目(W20132001)

The Credit Insurance Policy Ledge Financing in the Case of Default

  1. (College of Economy and Management, Taiyuan University of Science and Technology, Taiyuan 030024, China)
  • Online:2016-08-30 Published:2016-10-08

摘要:

为了解决制造商以及零售商均存在资金约束的供应链的融资问题,构建了零售商存在违约的情形时的信用保单质押融资模型。基于报童模型的随机规划问题和博弈论的分析方法,分析了不同利率条件下零售商的订货决策、银行的利率决策以及制造商的投保决策。分析表明,零售商控制本身的违约率,通过合理的订货量获取利润。制造商通过合理的投保水平以及批发价决策来实现本身的效益。银行确定合理的利率以及根据制造商的投保水平来确定融资额度,以求实现自身的利润。制造商以及银行都希望零售商有低的违约率。其中,信用保险对融资中的各方都是有利的。

关键词: 违约率, 信用保险, 保单质押

Abstract:

In order to solve the problem of financing of the manufacturer and the retailer, a credit policy pledge financing model is constructed. Based on the newsboy model of stochastic programming problem and game theory, the different interest rates under conditions of retailer′s ordering decisions, bank interest rate decisions and insurance decisions of the manufacturer are analyzed. The analysis shows that the retailer controls the default rate and obtains the profit by the reasonable order quantity. The manufacturer achieves benefits through reasonable insurance level and wholesale price decision. In order to achieve profits, banks determine a reasonable rate of interest as well as the manufacturer′s insurance level, to determine the amount of financing. Manufacturers and banks want retailers with a low default rate. Credit insurance is beneficial to all parties in financing.

Key words: default rate, credit insurance, insurance policy pledge