基于风险规避的绿色供应链定价研究

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2018.05.006

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了解决风险规避型厂商在不同市场结构下的绿色供应链定价问题，首先以由一个风险规避的制造商和一个风险规避的零售商组成的二级绿色供应链为背景，考虑了消费者偏好、产品绿色度、厂商风险规避度等因素，构建厂商的期望效用函数，然后运用博弈论的方法建立了集中决策模型和三种分散决策模型。比较分析了这四种模型下的批发价格、产品绿色度和零售价格，并进一步分析了四种模型在制造商与零售商风险态度不同时的情况。最后通过MATLAB软件数值仿真研究了集中决策模型下的风险规避度对批发价格、产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响以及产品绿色度对供应链效用的影响。仿真结果表明：在一定市场条件下，制造商风险规避对批发价格的影响程度要大于零售商，而对于产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响程度是相同的且负向相关；同时，在固定制造商和零售商的风险规避度为0.5时，最优产品绿色度在3.3~3.4之间，最大产品绿色度为7.8。

关键词: 风险规避, 绿色供应链, 产品绿色度, 博弈理论

Abstract: The determination of the product green degree and pricing of green supply chain in which the manufacturer and retailer are taking risk aversion is focused on. First of all, with a two-stage green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer as the background, consumer preferences, product green degree, degree of risk aversion and other factors are considered, and their expected utility functions are built. Then this problem is solved by game theory under two different scenarios:centralized and decentralized. In the centralized scenario, a model is adopted in which players of the green supply are integrated. In the decentralized scenario, a Stackelberg game model with the manufacturer as leader and the retailer as follower, a Stackelberg game model with the retailer as leader and the manufacturer as follower and a Nash Equilibrium game are established. Then a comparative analysis is conducted in terms of wholesale price, product green degree and retail price. On this basis, further comparative analysis is conducted when the manufacturer and retailer take different risk attitudes. Finally, a numerical simulation is given by MATLAB software in order to validate the centralized decision model. The simulation results show that under certain market conditions, the risk aversion of the manufacturer has greater influence on wholesale prices than the retailer, and the impacts on product green degree, retail prices, and supply chain utility are the same and negatively correlated; when the degree of risk aversion of the manufacturer and retailer is 0.5, the optimal product green degree is between 3.3 and 3.4, and the maximum product green degree is 7.8.

Key words: risk aversion, green supply chain, product green degree, game theory

中图分类号:

杨渠, 窦祥胜. 基于风险规避的绿色供应链定价研究[J]. 工业工程, 2018, 21(5): 40-49.

YANG Qu, DOU Xiangsheng. A Research on Green Supply Chain Pricing Based on Risk Aversion[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2018, 21(5): 40-49.

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