考虑绿色偏好和政府补贴的供应链营销策略研究

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2019.05.018

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为研究消费者绿色偏好和政府补贴的不同水平对供应链成员营销策略的影响问题，本文建立了仅包含一个制造商和一个零售商的营销策略选择模型，分别运用演化博弈理论和Matlab软件进行了理论分析和数值仿真。结果表明：只有当消费者绿色偏好以及政府补贴达到一定水平时才能有效促进制造商和零售商双方均采取绿色营销策略；当消费者绿色偏好或政府补贴处于较低水平时，零售商往往会通过搭便车的方式分享制造商绿色营销所带来的收益；随着制造商和零售商采取绿色营销策略所需投入成本的上升，双方采取绿色营销策略所需消费者绿色偏好水平也会上升，随着市场上消费者绿色偏好水平的上升，双方采取绿色营销策略所需政府补贴将会下降。

关键词: 供应链, 绿色营销, 绿色偏好, 政府补贴, 演化博弈

Abstract: In order to study the impact of different levels of consumers' green preferences and government subsidies on the supply chain members' marketing strategies, a marketing strategy selection model consisting only one manufacturer and one retailer is built, the theoretical analysis and numerical simulation are carried out by using evolutionary game theory and Matlab software respectively. The results show that only when consumers' green preferences and government subsidies reach a certain level they can effectively promote both the manufacturer and the retailer to adopt green marketing strategies; when consumers' green preferences or government subsidies are at a lower level, the retailer tends to share the benefit brought by the manufacturer's green marketing by means of free-riding; as the input costs required for the manufacturer and the retailer to adopt green marketing strategies rise, the level of consumers' green preferences required for both sides to adopt green marketing strategies will also rise. As the level of consumers' green preferences in the market rises, the government subsidies required for both sides to adopt green marketing strategies will decline.

Key words: supply chain, green marketing, green preference, government subsidies, evolutionary game

中图分类号:

F274

曹中秋, 张子元, 傅端香. 考虑绿色偏好和政府补贴的供应链营销策略研究[J]. 工业工程, 2019, 22(5): 141-149.

CAO Zhongqiu, ZHANG Ziyuan, FU Duanxiang. A Marketing Strategy Research of Supply Chain Considering Green Preference and Government Subsidies[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2019, 22(5): 141-149.

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