不同主导力量下考虑公平偏好的旅游供应链定价策略

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.01.012

工业工程 ›› 2020, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (1): 87-95.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.01.012

不同主导力量下考虑公平偏好的旅游供应链定价策略

林强¹, 陈林¹, 甯清万¹, 秦星红²

1. 重庆第二师范学院婴幼产品与服务供应链研究中心, 重庆 400067;
2. 重庆工商大学商务策划学院, 重庆 400067

收稿日期:2019-04-03 发布日期:2020-02-21
作者简介:林强(1988-),男,河南省人,讲师,硕士,主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71802031)；重庆市教委人文社会科学研究基地资助项目(18SKJD044)；重庆市教委科技学术研究资助项目(KJQN201802403)；重庆第二师范学院大学生科研项目(KY20180246)

A Research on Pricing Strategy of Tourism Supply Chain Based on Different Dominant Forces and Fairness Preference

LIN Qiang¹, CHEN Lin¹, NING Qingwan¹, QIN Xinghong²

1. Research Center for Infant Products and Services Supply Chain, Chongqing University of Education, Chongqing 400067, China;
2. School of Business Planning, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China

Received:2019-04-03 Published:2020-02-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了研究不同主导力量下决策者的公平偏好特征对旅游供应链定价策略的影响，建立了由一个景区和一个旅行社组成的旅游供应链Stackelberg主从博弈模型，在景区主导和旅行社主导两种供应链权势结构下，引入从属方的公平偏好特征，研究公平偏好信息对称与不对称情形下的定价策略，并进行对比分析。结果表明，景区主导情形下，旅行社公平偏好信息对称时，景区将采取降低门票批发价格行为，旅行社最优销售价格不变；旅行社公平偏好信息不对称时，景区最优门票价格不变，旅行社最优销售价格逐渐增大。旅行社主导情形下，无论景区公平偏好信息对称与否，景区最优门票批发价格逐渐增大，旅行社最优销售价格不变，但信息不对称下的景区最优门票价格小于信息对称情形。

关键词: 主导力量, 公平偏好, 旅游供应链, 定价策略, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: In order to study the influence of the fairness preference of the decision-maker under different leading forces on the pricing strategy of tourism service supply chain, a Stackelberg game model for tourism service supply chain composed of a scenic spot and a travel agency is established, and the fairness preference of dependent party is introduced into the model. Under different power structures of supply chain, the pricing strategies of information symmetry and asymmetry of fair preference are studied and compared. The results show that: in the case of the scenic spot dominating the supply chain, when the information of travel agencies' fairness preference is symmetrical, the scenic spot will adopt the behavior of reducing the wholesale price, and the optimal selling price of travel agency remains unchanged; when the information of the travel agency's fairness preference is asymmetric, the optimal wholesale price of scenic spot remains the same, while the optimal selling price of travel agency increases gradually. In the case of travel agency leading the supply chain, the optimal wholesale price of scenic spot gradually increases, and the optimal selling price of travel agency remains the same, whether the fairness preference information is symmetrical or not. However, the optimal wholesale price of scenic spots in the case of information asymmetry is smaller than that in the case of information symmetry.

Key words: leading force, fairness preference, tourism service supply chain, pricing strategy, Stackelberg game

中图分类号:

林强, 陈林, 甯清万, 秦星红. 不同主导力量下考虑公平偏好的旅游供应链定价策略[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(1): 87-95.

LIN Qiang, CHEN Lin, NING Qingwan, QIN Xinghong. A Research on Pricing Strategy of Tourism Supply Chain Based on Different Dominant Forces and Fairness Preference[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2020, 23(1): 87-95.

参考文献

[1] 周世平, 周永务, 彭碧涛. 旅游服务供应链相关问题的研究综述[J]. 华南理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2015, 17(2):22-26
ZHOU Shiping, ZHOU Yongwu, PENG Bitao. Research reviewed on the related issues of tourism service supply chain[J]. Journal of South China University of Technology(Social Science Edition), 2015, 17(2):22-26
[2] HAREWOOD S. Coordinating the tourism supply chain using bid prices[J]. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, 2008, 7(3):266-280
[3] DOND Y F, LING L Y, GUO X L. Travel package modeling:optimal bidding strategy of tour operator to cooperative hotels[J]. Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research, 2014, 19(12):1417-1440
[4] SONG H Y, YANG S, HUANG G Q. Price interactions between theme park and tour operator[J]. Tourism Economics, 2009, 15(4):813-824
[5] ZHANG X Y, SONG H Y, HUANG G Q, et al. Game-theoretic approach to tourism supply chain coordination under demand uncertainty for package holidays[J]. Tourism Analysis, 2010, 15(3):287-298
[6] HUANG Y, SONG H Y, HUANG G Q, et al. A comparative study of tourism supply chains with quantity competition[J]. Journal of Travel Research, 2012, 51(6):717-729
[7] GUO X L, HE L N. Tourism supply chain coordination:The cooperation between tourism hotel and tour operator[J]. Tourism Economics, 2012, 18(6):1361-1376
[8] DONG Y F, LING L Y. Hotel overbooking and cooperation with third-party websites[J]. Sustainability, 2015, 7(9):11696-11712
[9] 王晶晶, 郭强. 景区与旅行社的合作广告协调契约研究[J]. 管理学报, 2013, 10(2):260-265
WANG Jingjing, GUO Qiang. Cooperative advertising coordination contracts between scenic points and travel agencies[J]. Chinese Journal of Management, 2013, 10(2):260-265
[10] 赵黎明, 陈喆芝. 考虑消费偏好的旅游供应链纵向合作广告[J]. 系统管理学报, 2018, 27(4):753-760
ZHAO Liming, CHEN Zhezhi. Vertical cooperative advertising in a tourism supply chain considering consuming preference[J]. Journal of Systems&Management, 2018, 27(4):753-760
[11] 时萍萍, 龙勇. 考虑成本分担的旅游O2O供应链服务质量决策[J]. 旅游学刊, 2018, 33(11):88-97
SHI Pingping, LONG Yong. Service quality decision-making in tourism O2O supply chains considering service costs-sharing[J]. Tourism Tribune, 2018, 33(11):88-97
[12] 高尚, 滕春贤, 孙嘉轶. 不同主导力量下基于捆绑销售的旅游供应链决策分析[J]. 中国软科学, 2016(7):155-161
GAO Shang, TENG Chunxian, SUN Jiayi. Decision analysis of tourism supply chain based on bundling sales with different dominant power[J]. China Soft Science, 2016(7):155-161
[13] XU X. Revenue sharing contract versus wholesale price contract in a tourism supply chain[J]. International Journal of Supply Chain and Operations Resilience, 2016, 2(2):144-165
[14] LOCH C H, WU Y Z. Social preferences and supply chain performance:An experimental study[J]. Management Science, 2008, 54(11):1835-1849
[15] FEHR E, SCHMIDT K M. A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114(3):817-868
[16] 刘咏梅, 李立, 刘洪莲. 行为供应链研究综述[J]. 中南大学学报(社会科学版), 2011, 17(1):80-88
LIU Yongmei, LI Li, LIU Honglian. Behavioral supply chain management review[J]. Journal of Central South University(Social Sciences), 2011, 17(1):80-88
[17] 覃燕红, 潘亚运, 陈戈. 公平偏好下的供应链契约研究综述[J]. 重庆理工大学学报(社会科学), 2018, 32(1):71-80
QIN Yanhong, PAN Yayun, CHEN Ge. Review on supply chain contracts under fairness preference[J]. Journal of Chongqing University of Technology(Social Science), 2018, 32(1):71-80
[18] 林强, 魏光兴. 基于公平偏好的旅游供应链定价决策与契约协调[J]. 旅游学刊, 2018, 33(4):59-69
LIN Qiang, WEI Guangxing. Pricing-decisions and contract coordination of tourism service supply chain under fairness preference[J]. Tourism Tribune, 2018, 33(4):59-69
[19] 杜少甫, 杜婵, 梁樑, 等. 考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J]. 管理科学学报, 2010, 13(11):41-48
DU Shaofu, DU Chan, LIANG Liang, et al. Supply chain coordination considering fairness concerns[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2010, 13(11):41-48

不同主导力量下考虑公平偏好的旅游供应链定价策略

A Research on Pricing Strategy of Tourism Supply Chain Based on Different Dominant Forces and Fairness Preference

RichHTML

PDF

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 15

编辑推荐

Metrics

本文评价

[1]	覃燕红, 向林, 秦星红. 公平偏好下考虑双边保鲜努力的生鲜农产品供应链协调研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(5): 27-38.
[2]	徐兵, 李慧芳. 新鲜度差异下两种可替代生鲜品的多阶段定价策略研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(4): 10-19.
[3]	田永杰. 经销商公平偏好的供应链合作广告策略研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(4): 67-75.
[4]	吴春尚. 基于Stackelberg博弈模型的不同主导权的三级农产品电商供应链决策分析[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(4): 160-167.
[5]	陈佳媛, 周刚. 不同主导权结构下服务水平对高铁快递供应链价格策略的影响[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(4): 168-176.
[6]	黄帅, 杨玉中. 基于互补产品的双渠道供应链合作广告博弈分析[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(3): 153-160.
[7]	李芳, 马艳, 王豪丽. 制造商主导下差别主体努力的闭环供应链决策研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(2): 27-33.
[8]	邵必林, 王丽君. 不同契约下考虑公平偏好的供应商创新投入研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(2): 85-91,124.
[9]	李豪, 熊雪霞, 刘飞. 多品牌商线上线下竞争定价与渠道决策研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(1): 10-18.
[10]	宋英华, 曹雪竹, 刘丹. 考虑风险规避与零售商谎报行为的绿色供应链决策研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(1): 19-26,34.
[11]	邢光军, 李云云. 考虑消费者绿色偏好的竞争性闭环供应链生产决策研究[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(5): 22-29.
[12]	肖敏, 张耀. 双重干预及产能约束下的闭环供应链决策研究[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(4): 28-35.
[13]	张子健, 郭明波, 陈全朋. EPR下动力电池梯度利用的闭环供应链定价策略与协调机制[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(3): 10-18.
[14]	舒秘. 不同渠道结构下再制造商进入对制造商定价的影响[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(3): 30-37.
[15]	石永强, 王佳欣, 张智勇. 基于博弈论的两级逆向供应链定价策略研究[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(3): 45-50,58.