工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2021, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (3): 34-45.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2021.03.005

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于演化博弈模型的供应链利他偏好动态演进研究

覃燕红1, 白萌1, 林强2   

  1. 1. 重庆理工大学 管理学院，重庆 400054;
    2. 重庆第二师范学院 婴幼产品与服务供应链研究中心，重庆 400067
  • 收稿日期:2019-12-30 发布日期:2021-06-26
  • 作者简介:覃燕红（1981-），女，四川省人，教授，博士，主要研究方向为供应链管理、行为博弈

A Research on Dynamic Evolution of Altruism Preference in Supply Chain Based on Evolutionary Game

QIN Yanhong1, BAI Meng1, LIN Qiang2   

  1. 1. School of Management, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, China;
    2. Research Center for Infant Products and Services Supply Chain, Chongqing University of Education, Chongqing 400067, China
  • Received:2019-12-30 Published:2021-06-26

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摘要： 考虑供应链成员利他偏好行为和动态演进特征，分别在线性需求和非线性需求下建立相应的供应链决策模型。首先在短期内通过计算博弈支付矩阵对零供双方的均衡策略进行分析，其次在长期内运用演化博弈理论对零供双方进行单独演化分析、交互演化分析，最后将2种需求条件下供应链成员均衡策略进行比较，进而研究零售商利他偏好对供应链长期决策的影响。研究结果表明，短期内，供应商均衡策略依赖于零售商策略，而零售商均衡策略不受供应商影响且总是采取“偏好利他”策略；长期内，2种需求条件下零供博弈的均衡策略均为供应商采取“激励”策略、零售商采取“偏好利他”策略。此外，零售商利他偏好能提高供应商利润并使零售商实现效用最大化，进一步促进双方合作。

关键词: 激励策略, 利他偏好, 信息非对称, 演化博弈, 动态演进

Abstract: Considering the altruism preference of supply chain members and the dynamic evolution of supply chain, the corresponding decision models under linear demand and nonlinear demand are established. Firstly, the equilibrium strategies of supplier-retailer game are analyzed in the short term. Then, the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze independent evolution and interactive evolution of supplier-retailer game in the long term. Finally, the supply chain members' equilibrium strategies are compared under two demand conditions and the influence of retailers' altruism preference on the members' strategies studied. The results show that the supplier's equilibrium strategy relies on the retailer's strategy in the short term, but the retailer's equilibrium strategy is not affected by the supplier's. In the short term, the retailer always chooses altruism strategy. In the long term, the supplier always chooses incentive strategy and the retailer always chooses altruism preference strategy. Furthermore, the retailer's altruism preference can maximize his utility and increase the supplier's profit. It is also found that the retailer's altruism preference can help to promote cooperation among members in supply chain.

Key words: incentive strategy, altruism preference, information asymmetry, evolutionary game, dynamic evolution

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