基于SD及三方博弈的低碳供应链消费市场活力激发研究

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2021.04.018

工业工程 ›› 2021, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (4): 150-159.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2021.04.018

基于SD及三方博弈的低碳供应链消费市场活力激发研究

李晓华¹, 邵举平¹, 孙延安²

1. 苏州科技大学商学院，江苏苏州 215009;
2. 苏州优乐赛供应链管理有限公司，江苏苏州 215021

收稿日期:2020-03-03 发布日期:2021-09-02
通讯作者: 邵举平(1971-)，男，甘肃省人，教授，博士，主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理。E-mail：wlustbshao@163.com E-mail:wlustbshao@163.com
作者简介:李晓华 (1995-)，女，江苏省人，硕士研究生，主要研究方向为低碳供应链管理
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金资助项目(19BGL097)；江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划资助项目(KYCX19_2038)

A Research on Vitality Stimulating of Low-carbon Supply Chain Consumption Market Based on SD and Tripartite Game

LI Xiaohua¹, SHAO Juping¹, SUN Yan'an²

1. School of Business, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou 215009, China;
2. Anwood Logistics System Co. Ltd, Suzhou 215021, China

Received:2020-03-03 Published:2021-09-02

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对激发绿色低碳供应链产品消费市场活力问题，以绿色家电产品为例，构建包含政府、家电企业及消费者三方的演化博弈模型，分析策略稳定性。采用系统动力学方法，结合家电行业实际数据模拟策略变化情况，并验证稳定演化路径，分析具体影响因素。研究结果表明，政府策略受家电企业影响，家电企业策略受消费者影响，消费者策略受二者共同影响；家电企业低碳成本小于收益，低碳价格差小于低碳消费环境保护效用时，三方主体有唯一演化稳定策略(0,1,1)，即政府无需监管，家电企业积极提供绿色家电，消费者主动选择低碳消费；绿色低碳产品价差率应低于消费者27.3%的低碳溢价支付比率，低绿色偏好者环境保护效用需合力提高。

关键词: 低碳供应链, 市场活力激发, 三方主体, 演化博弈, 系统动力学(SD)

Abstract: Aiming at stimulating the consumption market vitality of green and low-carbon supply chain products, taking green household appliances as an example, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, household appliance enterprises and consumers is constructed to analyze the stability of strategies. The system dynamics method is used and combined with actual data of household appliance industry to simulate the changes of strategy, verify the stable evolution path, and analyze the specific influencing factors. The research results show that government strategy is affected by household appliance enterprises, household appliance enterprises strategy by consumers, and consumers strategy by both; when the low-carbon cost of household appliance enterprises is less than the income and the low-carbon price difference is less than the environmental protection effect of low-carbon consumption, tripartite participators have the only evolutionary stable strategy (0,1,1), that is, government does not need to supervise, household appliance enterprises actively provide green appliances, and consumers actively choose low-carbon consumption; the price difference rate of green and low-carbon products should be lower than consum-ers' low-carbon premium payment rate of 27.3%, and the environmental protection effect of low green preference consumers needs to be improved by joint efforts.

Key words: low-carbon supply chain, market vitality stimulation, tripartite participators, evolutionary game, system dynamics (SD)

中图分类号:

李晓华, 邵举平, 孙延安. 基于SD及三方博弈的低碳供应链消费市场活力激发研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(4): 150-159.

LI Xiaohua, SHAO Juping, SUN Yan'an. A Research on Vitality Stimulating of Low-carbon Supply Chain Consumption Market Based on SD and Tripartite Game[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2021, 24(4): 150-159.

参考文献

[1] 汪兴东, 景奉杰. 城市居民低碳购买行为模型研究——基于五个城市的调研数据[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2012, 22(2): 47-55
WANG Xingdong, JING Fengjie. Model research on urban resident' low-carbon purchasing behavior base on the survey data in five cities[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2012, 22(2): 47-55
[2] 石洪景. 基于Logistic模型的城市居民低碳消费意愿研究[J]. 北京理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2015, 17(5): 25-35
SHI Hongjing. Research on urban residents' willingness for low-carbon consumption based on logistic model[J]. Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology (Social Sciences Edition), 2015, 17(5): 25-35
[3] BISWAS A, ROY M. Leveraging factors for sustained green consumption behavior based on consumption value perceptions: testing the structural model[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2015, 95(1): 332-340
[4] SUN Yuhuan, LIU Ningning, ZHAO Mingzhu. Factors and mechanisms affecting green consumption in China: a multilevel analysis[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2019, 209(1): 481-493
[5] 孙德超, 曹志立. 政府引导低碳消费方式的障碍与消解路径探析[J]. 福建师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2015, 60(1): 18-22, 166
SUN Dechao, CAO Zhili. On the facing obstacles and resolutions of the government guiding low carbon consumption[J]. Journal of Fujian Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2015, 60(1): 18-22, 166
[6] 谢识予. 有限理性条件下的进化博弈理论[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2001, 3(5): 3-9
XIE Shiyu. Evolutionary game theory under bounded rationality[J]. Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 2001, 3(5): 3-9
[7] XU Ran, WANG Yanrong, WANG Wenbin, et al. Evolutionary game analysis for third-party governance of environmental pollution[J]. Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing, 2019, 10(8): 3143-3154
[8] CHEN Wanting, HU Zhihua. Using evolutionary game theory to study governments and manufacturers’ behavioral strategies under various carbon taxes and subsidies[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2018, 201(1): 123-141
[9] WANG Qiang, TAN Zhongfu, DE Gejirifu, et al. An evolutionary game study of clean heating promotion mechanisms under the policy regulation in China[J]. Sustainability, 2019, 11(14): 1-22
[10] ZHOU Xiao, ZHAO Rui, CHENG Liang, et al. Impact of policy incentives on electric vehicles development: a system dynamics-based evolutionary game theoretical analysis[J]. Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy, 2019, 21(5): 1039-1053
[11] ZHAO Xingang, ZHANG Yuzhuo. The system dynamics (SD) analysis of the government and power producers’ evolutionary game strategies based on carbon trading (CT) mechanism: a case of China[J]. Sustainability, 2018, 10(4): 1-18
[12] RITZBERGER K, WEIBULL J W. Evolutionary selection in normal-form games[J]. Econometrica, 1995, 63(6): 1371-1399
[13] FRIEDMAN D. Evolutionary games in economics[J]. Econometrica, 1991, 59(3): 637-666
[14] LYAPUNOV A M. The general problem of the stability of motion[J]. International Journal of Control, 1992, 55(3): 531-534
[15] 中国家用电器研究院, 全国家用电器工业信息中心. 中国家电行业年度报告(2019)[J]. 家用电器, 2020, 27(3): 38-59
[16] 刘鹤, 范莉莉. 碳标签产品“溢价”支付意愿及其影响因素研究[J]. 价格理论与实践, 2018, 38(5): 123-126
LIU He, FAN Lili. Research on pay willingness and its influencing factors of carbon label products "premium"[J]. Price: Theory & Practice, 2018, 38(5): 123-126
[17] 彭维亮, 顾蕾, 胡晨沛, 等. 碳标签情景模拟下的消费者低碳竹(木)地板支付意愿[J]. 浙江农林大学学报, 2015, 32(5): 655-660
PENG Weiliang, GU Lei, HU Chenpei, et al. A research on consumers' willingness to pay for low-carbon floor in the scenario simulation of carbon labeling[J]. Journal of Zhejiang A & F University, 2015, 32(5): 655-660
[18] 应瑞瑶, 徐斌, 胡浩. 城市居民对低碳农产品支付意愿与动机研究[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2012, 22(11): 165-171
YING Ruiyao, XU Bin, HU Hao. China urban resident's motives of willingness to pay for low-carbon agricultural products[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2012, 22(11): 165-171

基于SD及三方博弈的低碳供应链消费市场活力激发研究

A Research on Vitality Stimulating of Low-carbon Supply Chain Consumption Market Based on SD and Tripartite Game

RichHTML

PDF

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 15

编辑推荐

Metrics

本文评价

[1]	杜建国, 王雅柔. 考虑公平关切的低碳双渠道供应链决策研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(5): 18-26.
[2]	杨轩, 罗建强. 基于供需行为博弈的制造企业混合产品提供模式[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(4): 119-126.
[3]	覃燕红, 白萌, 林强. 基于演化博弈模型的供应链利他偏好动态演进研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(3): 34-45.
[4]	刘昊, 樊毓卿, 张诗青. 碳限额交易机制下低碳供应链协调策略[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(3): 60-67,82.
[5]	庄丽, 马婷婷, 刘硕, 刘兰梅. 基于PT-MA理论的装配式建筑施工安全管理行为演化博弈分析[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(2): 68-76,118.
[6]	刘珈琪, 刘继才, 雷晓莹. PPP项目政府激励与社会资本努力的演化博弈与仿真[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(2): 77-84.
[7]	霍红, 白艺彩. 基于互联网环境的生鲜农产品质量安全控制研究[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(6): 52-59.
[8]	许彤, 张雄. 资金与碳排放双重约束下低碳供应链决策研究[J]. 工业工程, 2019, 22(5): 75-81,117.
[9]	曹中秋, 张子元, 傅端香. 考虑绿色偏好和政府补贴的供应链营销策略研究[J]. 工业工程, 2019, 22(5): 141-149.
[10]	曲优, 关志民, 赵莹. 考虑生产商风险规避的农产品绿色投资策略演化研究[J]. 工业工程, 2019, 22(3): 65-76.
[11]	李小莉, 程硕. 网络效应下银行与电商平台的供应链金融合作策略演化分析[J]. 工业工程, 2019, 22(2): 35-41.
[12]	陈海荣, 李小莉, 谢天, 李从东. 考虑未来成本的医疗寻租行为监管演化博弈分析[J]. 工业工程, 2017, 20(3): 89-94,105.
[13]	张学龙, 王军进. 基于博弈理论的供应链信任稳定演化策略[J]. 工业工程, 2015, 18(5): 81-86.
[14]	高艳, 石岿然. 有限理性企业生产决策的演化研究[J]. 工业工程, 2015, 18(3): 63-68.
[15]	罗静，李从东. 基于演化博弈的应急物资生产能力储备策略[J]. 工业工程, 2015, 18(2): 15-19.