商业信用与促销努力下垄断制造商和竞争性双寡头零售商的协调

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2022.01.012

工业工程 ›› 2022, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (1): 101-107.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2022.01.012

商业信用与促销努力下垄断制造商和竞争性双寡头零售商的协调

于丽萍, 魏艳红

东北大学工商管理学院，辽宁沈阳 110169

收稿日期:2020-07-13 发布日期:2022-03-02
作者简介:于丽萍 (1970—)，女，甘肃省人，副教授，博士，主要研究方向为供应链财务管理
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71772035, 71571041)

Coordination Between the Monopolistic Manufacturer and the Competing Duopolistic Retailers Based on Trade Credit and Promotional Efforts

YU Liping, WEI Yanhong

School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169, China

Received:2020-07-13 Published:2022-03-02

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在垄断制造商和竞争性双寡头零售商构成的两级供应链中，通过考虑零售商所做的促销努力和制造商提供的商业信用，建立两个零售商之间Nash均衡、合谋和Stackelberg均衡3种情况下的供应链分散和集中决策模型，分析供应链成员和整个渠道的绩效，得到信用期限和促销努力的最优值。在此基础上，同时考虑供应链成员的竞争与协调，通过兼顾供应链成员的个体利益和渠道整体利益，确定实现协调的契约参数与条件。最后通过数值算例对模型进行比较和验证。结果表明，所建立的协调机制既能保证供应链成员的参与，又提高了渠道的整体利益，从而实现供应链的协调。

关键词: 垄断制造商, 双寡头零售商, 商业信用, 促销努力, 竞争与协调

Abstract: The performance of a supply chain (SC) consisting of a monopolistic manufacturer and two competing retailers has been analyzed under a credit-period promotional-effort dependent demand. The trade credit made by the manufacturer and the promotional efforts offered by the competing retailers. Through the establishment of three kinds of decentralized decision-making models (Nash, Collusion and Stackelberg) and centralized decision models of supply chain between two retailers, the performance of supply chain members and the whole channel is analyzed, and the optimal value of trade credit and promotion efforts derived. On this basis, competition and coordination of supply chain members are considered, by balancing individual interests of the supply chain members and the interests of the whole channel, and then coordination contract parameters and conditions of the channel determined. Finally, through a numerical example and sensitivity analysis, the models are verified and compared. The results show the coordination mechanism can improve the profit of the whole supply chain, and guarantee the participation of all members of the supply chain, realizing the supply chain channel coordination.

Key words: monopolistic manufacturer, duopolistic retailers, trade credit, promotional efforts, competition and coordination

中图分类号:

F270

于丽萍, 魏艳红. 商业信用与促销努力下垄断制造商和竞争性双寡头零售商的协调[J]. 工业工程, 2022, 25(1): 101-107.

YU Liping, WEI Yanhong. Coordination Between the Monopolistic Manufacturer and the Competing Duopolistic Retailers Based on Trade Credit and Promotional Efforts[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2022, 25(1): 101-107.

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商业信用与促销努力下垄断制造商和竞争性双寡头零售商的协调

Coordination Between the Monopolistic Manufacturer and the Competing Duopolistic Retailers Based on Trade Credit and Promotional Efforts

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