工业工程 ›› 2022, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (6): 82-91.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2022.06.010

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑竞争关系的重大工程多主体平行施工资源共享行为研究

刘娜娜, 周国华   

  1. 西南交通大学 经济管理学院,四川 成都 610031
  • 收稿日期:2021-06-21 发布日期:2022-12-23
  • 通讯作者: 周国华 (1966—) ,男,四川省人,教授,博士,主要研究方向为重大工程项目管理。Email:ghzhou@126.com E-mail:ghzhou@126.com
  • 作者简介:刘娜娜(1993—),女,山东省人,博士研究生,主要研究方向为重大工程项目管理
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金重大专项资助项目(71942006);四川省科学技术厅资助项目(2021ZYD0100)

A Research on Multi-agent Resource Sharing Behavior of Mega Projects under Competitive Relationship

LIU Nana, ZHOU Guohua   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China
  • Received:2021-06-21 Published:2022-12-23

摘要: 为了分析不同机制下重大工程多主体平行施工资源共享行为,将重大工程多主体平行施工分为工程量不存在竞争和存在竞争两种情境,分别构建两种情境下以资源需求方为主导者、资源共享方为跟随者的Stackelberg动态博弈模型,分析资源共享均衡策略及最优收益,探讨业主激励、资源共享效率、成本系数等因素对均衡结果的影响。研究发现,不论有无竞争机制,在均衡策略下各主体因资源共享获得额外收益,且资源接收者所获收益大于资源共享者所获收益;无竞争机制下,业主激励强度对最优资源共享价格、最优资源共享量、最优资源共享收益均有正向的影响;竞争机制下,业主激励强度对最优资源共享量、最优资源共享收益具有正向的影响,而对最优资源共享价格具有负向影响。

关键词: 重大工程, 资源共享, 竞争机制, 平行施工

Abstract: In order to analyze resource sharing behavior of multi-subject parallel construction of major projects under different mechanisms, the multi-agent parallel construction scenarios of major projects were divided into non-competitive engineering amount and competitive engineering amount. The Stackelberg dynamic game models with the resource demander as the leader and the resource provider as the follower in the two scenarios were constructed separately. And the resource sharing balance strategy and the optimal benefit were calculated and analyzed, and then the influence of factors such as owner's incentives, resource sharing efficiency, and cost coefficients on the equilibrium results were discussed. This study found that: under the equilibrium strategy, each construction entity can obtain additional benefits through resource sharing whether there is competition or not, and the benefits of resource recipients are greater than that of resource sharers; without competition mechanism, the owner's incentive intensity has a positive impact on the optimal resource sharing price, optimal resource sharing amount, and optimal resource sharing revenue; with competitive mechanism, the owner's incentive intensity has a positive effect on the optimal resource sharing amount, the optimal resource sharing revenue, but has a negative effect on the optimal resource sharing price.

Key words: mega project, resource sharing, competitive mechanism, parallel construction

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