The Influence of Technical Ability on Benefits Incentive Contract for IT R&D Outsourcing Project

Abstract

Abstract:

From the perspective of technological capability, an analysis is conducted on the influence of the technical ability of both the enterprise and the R&D company and the corresponding technology integration risk to the development of IT outsourcing incentive contract. Aiming at both information symmetry and asymmetry, an incentive model is constructed based on the principal agent, and through the model, the influence of technical ability on the enterprise income is analyzed. The results show that, under information symmetry, the higher the technical capacity of the R&D company is, the more effort it will make. The ability of the enterprise will not affect the R&D company′s effort level. Enterprise earnings will increase with the technical ability of both sides, but when reaching the threshold, it will reduce. Under information asymmetry, the higher the technical ability of the enterprise is, the more reluctant the R&D company is to make effort. Enterprise′s incentive degree is inversely proportional to the technical ability of both sides, and the relationship between technical ability of both sides and enterprise earnings is not clear.

Key words: single-stage, IT R&D outsourcing, technical ability, principal agent, risk

CHU Yanfeng, GONG bin. The Influence of Technical Ability on Benefits Incentive Contract for IT R&D Outsourcing Project[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2016, 19(3): 51-58.

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