Abstract: In this paper, a closedloop remanufacturing supply chain with pricesensitive stochastic demands is addressed. Such a supply chain can be operated under centralized decisionmaking mode with the manufacturer as Stackelberg leader and three decentralized usedproduct collection modes: manufacturer, retailer, and thirdparty collection. For such a supply chain, pricing policy and profit are analyzed under centralized and decentralized modes, respectively. Under centralized decisionmaking mode, a firstorder necessary condition for coordinating the supply chain is derived. Then, it is shown that, under decentralized decisionmaking mode, the supply chain can be perfectly coordinated by using a compound contract with total return policy, and sale rebate and penalty. In this way, winwin can be achieved. By comparison, it also shows that thirdparty collection cant be chosen by the manufacturer. Coordination sufficiency and efficiency are also analyzed. A numerical example is given to verify the proposed method.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, remanufacturing, contract coordination, Stackelberg game