Abstract: Based on supply chain finance (SCF), the linear incentive between supplier and retailer is studied from the perspective of multi-task principalagency theory. Effects of different parameters on the stimulation intensity and the expected income of the manufacturer are analyzed in different information circumstances. Also, the optimal level of effort at which the receivable business of SCF can run normally under different information conditions is discussed. It is found that, with symmetric information, by reasonable linear incentive scheme, the manufacturer is able to enable the supplier to reach the optimal level of effort. With asymmetric information, the expected income of manufacturer is proportional to the influence of supplier efforts to it. At the same time, the expected income of manufacturer also has a negative correlation with supplier cost coefficient and risk aversion. In addition, there is a negative correlation with the incentive share and supplier risk aversion.  

Key words: supply chain finance (SCF), multi-task principal-agent model, incentive mechanism