Industrial Engineering Journal ›› 2013, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (5): 96-101.

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Chinese Enterprises'Outward Direct Investment

  

  1. 1.School of Finance and Economics, Jiansu University,Zhenjiang 212013, China;
    2.School of Management, Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013, China
  • Online:2013-10-31 Published:2013-12-09

Abstract: Compared with China ODI scale and increment, the benefits from outward direct investment deserve more attention. Simulation by MATLAB on the basis of an evolutionary game model shows that if 70% state-owned enterprises (SOEs) engage in ODI, non-SOEs will follow suit irrespective of initial -amount of non-SOEs ODI. Whereas if 30% SOEs engage in ODI, non-SOEs will follow suit only when 40% non-SOEs implement initial ODI. And non-SOEs will not invest outward if initial non-SOEs ODI is less than 10%. The more revenues from outward investment, the more rapid adoption of ODI strategy is realized. If initially less than 40% enterprises invest outward and nonSOEs initial revenues from ODI -equal-extra cost, convergence is to no ODI. Finally, suggestions are put forward.    

Key words: outward direct investment (ODI), revenue, evolutionary game, evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)