Abstract: Under asymmetric carbon information between upstream and downstream enterprises, in order to study the optimal misreporting decision, the Stackelberg game theory is adopted to discuss a two-echelon supply chain led by a manufacturer. A new production model is established based on carbon emission trading mechanism, and the optimal operation decisions of supply chain participants are obtained through the converse solution method. Besides, both the manufacturer and the retailer’s misreporting behavior and their influences on supply chain performance are discussed by a qualitative analysis. The results imply that there are big differences between carbon information misreporting and cost misreporting in supply chain. Manufacturer could seek his maximum profit whether he misreports or not. Compared with reflecting carbon information honestly, retailer prefers to under-report carbon information, and the misreporting of the retailer will increase both the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer. However, the supply chain profits in misreporting situation are still lower than the optimal supply chain profits. The manufacturer can coordinate the supply chain with revenue-sharing contract, and the optimal revenue-sharing coefficient has positive correlation with retailer’s profits in misreporting situation.

Key words: carbon emission, carbon price, asymmetric information, misreporting, revenue sharing contract