Quality Control and Coordination in Elderly Service Supply Chain Based on Bonus and Penalty Dual Contract

Abstract

Abstract:

Equilibrium is analyzed from three different scenarios of separate decision, united decision and bonus and penalty dual contract based on the Elderly Service Supply Chain (ESSC) between one elderly service integrator (ESI) and one elderly service supplier (ESS) with a single and homogeneous elderly service need. The promotion of bonus and penalty dual contract to the elderly service quality decision and the profits of the supply chain members are also studied. The results show that the possibility of providing high quality elderly service will increase by improving the integration of the ESSC and when the change of the demand scale is sensitive to the service quality improvement, bonus and penalty contract can get better coordination effect. In addition, if the ESI is at the core position of the ESSC, when the ESI and the ESS reach bonus and penalty contract providing high quality elderly service, the ESI would obtain most of the increased profit.

Key words: elderly service supply chain, elderly service quality, bonus and penalty dual contract, supply chain coordination

ZHANG Zhiyong, LV Jiaxin, SHI Yongqiang. Quality Control and Coordination in Elderly Service Supply Chain Based on Bonus and Penalty Dual Contract[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal .

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