Grading Medical Service Strategy for Public Hospitals Based on Game Theory

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e16-1041

Abstract

Abstract: Aiming at hierarchical medical service between public hospitals, a duopoly game model is established based on patients' rational perception of healthcare service. The model studies the strategic choices of different grade hospitals that face the same disease treatment under co-regulation of government and healthcare market. The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is applied in the analysis of the profit trade off between two hospitals. Results show that hospitals can differentiate quality and price of service to get optimal profits and that government can differentiate reimbursement ratio to promote bypass of patients in third-grade hospital. The research can support pricing and reimbursement decision making of medical treatment for public hospitals.

Key words: grading treatment, game theory, medical reimbursement

CLC Number:

C934

WANG Ning, MIAO Rui, JIANG Zhibin. Grading Medical Service Strategy for Public Hospitals Based on Game Theory[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2017, 20(2): 26-31.

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