Industrial Engineering Journal ›› 2019, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (1): 36-44.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2019.01.005

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Producing and Recycle Pricing Competitive Strategies of the OEM and the Third Party under the Authorization Mode

YANG Aifeng, ZHAN Qianying, SONG Mingzhu, HU Xiaojian   

  1. School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China
  • Received:2018-05-29 Online:2019-02-28 Published:2019-02-26

Abstract: Assuming that the third party remanufacturer (third party) needs to pay the authorization fee to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in order to recycle and remanufacture the used items, the OEM and the third party compete in both the forward supply chain sale market and the reverse supply chain recovery market. A Cournot game model is set up with constraints to maximize the closed-loop supply chain profits of both sides. It obtains the optimal production amount and the optimal recovery price of end-of-use products under third party partial remanufacturing and third party completing remanufacturing by using K-T condition. Finally, the influence of the unit authorization fee and other parameters on the decision variables and the optimal profits are analyzed by means of analytical methods and numerical examples.

Key words: remanufacturing, recycle pricing, authorization, Cournot game, competition

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