Industrial Engineering Journal ›› 2021, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (2): 85-91,124.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2021.02.011

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A Research on the Supplier's Innovation Investment Considering Fairness Preference under Different Contracts

SHAO Bilin, WANG Lijun   

  1. School of Management, Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology, Xi'an 710055, China
  • Received:2019-11-25 Published:2021-04-25

Abstract: Considering a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer, the theory of fairness preference, the effects of supplier's fairness preference on his innovation investment is explored. By establishing a supply chain decision model with Stackelberg games under wholesale price contract, research cost sharing contract and revenue sharing contract, the effects of fairness preference coefficient on supply chain equilibrium strategy under different contracts are compared and analyzed. The results show that the level of supplier innovation and supply chain's utility under research cost-sharing contract are always higher than other contracts. The level of supplier innovation and the supply chain overall utility under revenue sharing contract is higher than that of wholesale price contract. The utility of manufacturer and the supplier under wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract is related to the fair preference coefficient of the supplier and the supplier retained utility under revenue sharing contract.

Key words: fairnesss preference, supply chain contract, supplier's innovation investment, supply chain's utility

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