Abstract: In the supply chain of fresh agricultural products dominated by the supplier, considering the level of fresh-keeping efforts of both the supplier and the retailer and the efforts will affect the freshness and market demand of fresh agricultural products, a Stackelberg game model was set to analyze the impact of retailer's fairness concern on the bilateral fresh-keeping effort level and supply chain coordination. The principal-agent model was applied to design a combined contract based on "wholesale price + transfer payment" in order to increase the overall benefit and stability of the supply chain and better coordinate the interest of both the supplier and the retailer. Research shows that the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural product whether the retailer is concerned about fairness, and the retailer's fairness concern further reduces the level of bilateral fresh-keeping efforts and further deviates the supply chain from optimal status. Finally, the combined contract based on "wholesale price + transfer payment" can not only achieve the optimal solution of bilateral fresh-keeping efforts and the coordination of fresh agricultural products supply chain, but also achieve Pareto profit improvement of each supply chain members.

Key words: fresh agricultural products supply chain, fairness concern, bilateral fresh-keeping efforts, wholesale price contract, transfer payment