Abstract: In order to study the impact of the corporate social responsibility of logistics service integrators on the decision-making of three-level logistics service supply chain, the demand function affected by the price and corporate social responsibility is built and a Stackelberg game method is used to analyze the optimal decisions under the decentralized model and centralized model. It is found that the level of logistics demand and corporate social responsibility under centralized decision-making is more than twice that under decentralized decision-making, and the total profit of supply chain increases significantly. In order to achieve the optimal strategy, a cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract with compensation is designed, and the compensation amount is set by quoting the bargaining model. It is found that the contract can realize the coordination of the supply chain, the awareness of social responsibility and relative bargaining power are positively correlated with members' profits, logistics demand and corporate social responsibility level, and integrators can benefit faster. The amount of compensation depends on the bargaining power of members. With the improvement of relative bargaining power, the compensation received by subcontractors increases. Finally, an example is given to verify the effectiveness of the contract.

Key words: corporate social responsibility, logistics service, supply chain coordination