A Research on Stable Evolutionary Strategy of-Supply Chain Trust Based on Game Theory
Zhang Xue-long, Wang Jun-jin
2015, 18 (5):
81-86.
Considering three different evolutionary stages of supply chain trust, their stable evolutionary strategies are studied. Aiming at the limitation of the traditional game, sound and unsound constraint mechanism are taken into account. Bringing the extra incomes trusted by both enterprises, costs of unilateral trust, extra revenues of unilateral distrust, costs of unilateral distrust and additional compensation of unilateral trust into the matrix of evolutionary game, stable evolutionary strategy of every stage is analyzed by using the evolutionary game theory. In order to validate the feasibility and effectiveness of the model, the numbers are analyzed, the changes of dynamics about the evolution of models researched into, and then corresponding systematic diagram worked out. The results show that cooperation achieves steady state and supply chain overall income is maximal when the probability of supply chain trust is greater than 0.75, and the stable evolutionary strategy which is under the unsound restraint mechanism is superior to that under the traditional one. But when restraint mechanism is unsound, not all the stable evolutionary strategies of enterprises are trustable. So it is imperative to improve the constraint mechanism, by which, when sound, the steady evolutionary strategy of enterprise can be finally trustable.
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