In order to solve the brand strategy decision problem of the packaging enterprises that provide packaging to food manufacturers, the material grade and design level of packaging are taken as the signals to convey the quality of the products. Using signal game theory, the brand strategy decision of packaging enterprises is studied and analyzed under merger equilibrium, separation equilibrium and mixed equilibrium with the goal of maximizing the profit of packaging enterprises and product manufacturers. Some valuable managerial insights are obtained. Under incomplete information game, the optimal decision of the packaging enterprise is to provide and implement high-end brand strategy under the mixed equilibrium for the manufacturers of high-quality products, and to provide and implement the low-end brand strategy under the separation equilibrium for the manufacturers of low-quality products. Comparing with the decision of complete information game, it is found that the brand strategy of the packaging enterprise can be used as signals to effectively distinguish the product quality of the product manufacturer. Although high-end branding strategies can help manufacturers disguise low-quality products, the possibility of consumers purchase of high quality products is increased.
