A Research on Risk Aversion-based Green Supply Chain Pricing and Government Subsidies
ZHU Lin, DOU Xiangsheng
2020, 23 (5):
158-168.
doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.05.021
Aiming at a two-stage green supply chain system consisting of retailers and manufacturers who are both taking risk aversion and based on the government’s policy environment of subsidizing manufacturers’ production costs, and under the assumption that retailers and manufacturers work together on ecological efforts, the equilibrium retail price, equilibrium wholesale price and equilibrium green degree of product in two different game model of retailers leading Stackelberg game model and centralized control game model are explored. In addition, government subsidies for green manufacturers is another assumption of this research. Furthermore, in a retailers leading Stackelberg game model, the equilibrium value of retail price, wholesale price and green degree of product are analyzed and compared under three different government policies: subsidies to green manufacturers, subsidies to green consumers and no subsidy policy. Finally, a numerical method is used to investigate the impact of government subsidy ratio, risk-defending degree of manufacturers and retailers to other factors. The results show that in a retailers leading Stackelberg game model, risk-defending degree of manufacturers has more significant influence on other factors. Besides, government subsidies to green consumers has better effect on improving green product quality, reducing price, stimulating green demand and improving social welfare.
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