考虑政府规制与库存容量限制下的逆向供应链决策

    Reverse Supply Chain Decision Making under Government Regulation and Storage Capacity Constraint

    • 摘要: 为了得出库存设施由链中哪方成员拥有和租借才能使逆向供应链最优化,运用博弈理论和双层规划理论分析了政府规制下由回收商拥有废旧品库存设施和制造商拥有废旧品库存设施的逆向供应链决策模型。通过政府环境规制下和政府补贴一致下的数值仿真,经过比较得出在政府环境规制下,库存设施在回收商一方对逆向供应链效益的影响要比在制造商一方更优。而在政府补贴一致下,库存设施在制造商一方对逆向供应链效益的影响要比在回收商一方更好。

       

      Abstract: A reverse supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a recycler is discussed in this paper. Such a supply chain can operate in two modes: 1) the manufacturer owns storage facilities and has the right to release them; and 2) the recycler owns storage facilities and has the right to release them. The question is that under which mode the profit of the whole supply chain can be maximized. To answer this question, a twolevel gametheoretic model is developed under both modes with government environmental regulation and subsidy taken into account. With the model, numerical simulation is carried out. Results show that when there are environmental regulation and constant subsidy from a government, and facilities should be rented for waste product storage, Mode 2) is better than Mode 1). However, when there is no government environmental regulation, Mode 1) is better than Mode 2).

       

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