考虑生产商风险规避的农产品绿色投资策略演化研究

    Green Investment Strategy Selection and Behavioral Evolution of Original Agricultural Products with Risk-averse Manufacturers

    • 摘要: 针对农户与生产商绿色投资策略的选择问题,构建以农户为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,得到双方在不同策略组合下的支付矩阵。以此为依据,运用演化博弈理论,研究农户与风险规避生产商两类异质群体绿色投资策略选择的演化过程,推演不同条件下系统的演化稳定策略,探讨双方绿色投资策略选择的演化路径及其影响因素。结果表明,面对具有绿色农产品消费偏好的消费者时,农户与生产商至少有一方会选择绿色投资策略,当双方选择合作并分担绿色投资成本时市场需求最大。此时,成本分担比例及生产商风险规避程度对两群体的策略选择演化速度、绩效水平具有显著影响。

       

      Abstract: Customers’ preference to greener agricultural products makes farmers and downstream manufacturers realize the importance of improving the greenness of primary agricultural products. Aiming at the farmers and risk-averse manufacturers’ decision on green investment in primary agricultural products, the payoff matrix is obtained by developing a Stackelberg game. Based on evolution game theory, the evolutionary process of the two heterogeneous groups has been analyzed and the ESS (Evolutionary Stability Strategy) gained. A simulation of the system evolutionary process has also been conducted. The results show that facing the customers who possess green purchase preference, at least one side of the farmers and manufacturers will invest in improving the greenness of primary agricultural products. When they collaborate and share the investment costs, an ideal equilibrium state system will be evolved; under the ideal equilibrium state, the evolutionary velocities and revenue (utility) of the farmers and manufacturers are directly related with the manufacturers’ risk-averse parameters and costs sharing proportion.

       

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