Abstract: The blockage of traditional financing channels forces many start-ups to turn their attention to the public, hoping to obtain initial investment through crowdfunding. However, the project information released by enterprises on crowdfunding platform aggravates the risk of product being imitated. Therefore, the feasibility and optimization design of crowdfunding contract are studied in order to reduce the loss caused by imitation competition, that is, to strike a balance between traditional product market distortion caused by crowdfunding and external imitation competition. The analysis shows that such crowdfunding contracts can enable otherwise underfunded projects to be executed, and highlight the new interaction between external imitation competition and corporate product pricing, financing goals, and profits. More intense imitation competition reduces the ability of crowd-funding enterprises to extract earnings, and enterprises will formulate corresponding crowd-funding contracts to deal with imitation competition. Some theoretical advice and practical reference are provided for the development of crowdfunding projects in imitative competition.