政府有限管制下考虑再制品延保服务的三方演化博弈分析

    A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Extended Warranty Service for Remanufactured Products under Government Restricted Control Policies

    • 摘要: 通过构建包含消费者、再制品制造商和政府的三方演化博弈模型,确定收益矩阵和复制动态方程,探究政府有限管制对再制品延保产业发展的推动作用。基于生命周期理论,模拟产业发展的3个关键阶段间的演化路径并分析关键参数对演化结果的影响。结果表明,在产业发展初期阶段,政府可通过加大奖赏力度推动再制品延保产业向中期阶段演化;在产业发展中期阶段,政府需合理控制奖惩力度,确保博弈三方均能从中获利;在产业发展成熟阶段,环境问题得到大幅度改善,政府积极管制具有边际递减收益,政府应采取消极管制策略;产品的故障率会影响每个博弈主体的最终演化策略,故障率过高可能会导致演化系统失调,制造商和政府需积极采取措施保障产品质量。

       

      Abstract: By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of the consumer, the remanufacturer and the government to determine the payoff matrice and the replicator dynamic equation, and the impact of government restricted control policies on the development of extended warranty industry is explored. Based on the life cycle theory, the evolution path between the three key stages of industry development is simulated, and the impact of key parameters on the evolution result is analyzed. The results show that in the initial stage of industry development, the government can increase the subsidy promote the evolution of the extended warranty industry to the middle stage. In the middle stage, the government needs to reasonably control the incentives and penalty to ensure that all three parties in the game can profit from it. In the mature stage, environmental problems have been greatly improved. Active regulation has marginal diminishing returns, and the government should adopt a passive control strategy. The failure rate of the remanufactured product will affect the final evolution strategy of each game player. An excessively high failure rate may cause system disorders. The remanufacturer and the government need to actively take measures to ensure product quality.

       

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