Abstract: To explore the phenomenon of behavior-based price (BBP) discrimination on on-demand platforms offering green services, a competition model consist of an on-demand platform offering green services and a traditional on-demand platform is established considering two scenarios (i.e., neither platform using BBP and both platforms using BBP). A two-period dynamic game-theoretic model is used to study how the adoption of BBP and implementation of green services affect various stakeholders. Results show that when green services are provided, there is a triple-win outcome; service providers can obtain higher (lower) payoffs when joining the platform in the first (second) period; when green services are provided, BBP generates lower profits given larger commission ratios, cost coefficient, and strength of consumer preference; however, the implementation of BBP results in lower profits when green services are not provided; moreover, BBP does not always lead to high consumer surplus, which depends on the trade-off between the two powers from market shares and service prices.