产出双重不确定下考虑CSR的供应链协调策略

    A Supply Chain Coordination Strategy Considering CSR with Dual Yield Uncertainties

    • 摘要: 以上游零件供应商为领导者,下游制造商为追随者的两级供应链为研究对象,构建基于批发价格契约、收益共享契约以及两部定价契约的协调模型,探讨在消费者具有社会责任意识以及产出不确定下,不同契约机制对供应链成员的CSR投入水平与供应链运行绩效的影响。研究结果表明:上下游的产出不确定均会降低供应链成员的CSR投入水平,甚至损害供应链系统绩效。当契约参数在一定范围内时,收益共享契约与两部定价契约均可实现供应链系统的协调,其中,对于供应商而言,两部定价契约下较高的零件批发价格可实现资金提前回流;对于制造商而言,收益共享契约下较低的零件批发价格可以减轻前期生产压力。

       

      Abstract: Focusing on a two-tier supply chain with upstream component suppliers as leaders and downstream manufacturers as followers, this paper establishes coordination models based on wholesale price contracts, revenue sharing contracts, and two-part pricing contracts. The impact of different contract mechanisms on the level of CSR investment by supply chain members and the performance of a supply chain is explored with consumer social responsibility and yield uncertainties. Results show that both upstream and downstream yield uncertainties can reduce the level of CSR investment by supply chain members, and even undermine the system performance of a supply chain. When the contract parameters are within certain ranges, both revenue sharing contracts and two-part pricing contracts can achieve coordination in a supply chain system. Under such conditions, for suppliers, high wholesale prices for parts with two-part pricing contracts can facilitate capital inflow; for manufacturers, low wholesale prices for parts with revenue-sharing contracts can reduce early production pressure.

       

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