Abstract: Based on reference price effect, this study establishes and solves two-period game models for two remanufacturing modes, i.e., outsourcing the remanufacturing business by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or authorizing it to a third-party remanufacturer (TPR). The influences of the reference price effect and consumer preference are analyzed, and then the two modes are compared. Results show that: with the increase of reference price coefficient, in the authorizing mode, the prices of both new and remanufactured products decrease, while the sales of new products and remanufactured products increase and decrease, respectively. In the outsourcing mode, if the consumer preference is particularly high, the impacts of reference price coefficient on prices and sales depend on the cost-savings of remanufacturing. In most cases, OEM prefers the authorizing mode; only when the production cost of new products and the recycling investment coefficient are both very low, and the consumer preference and the reference price coefficient are both fairlyhigh, does OEM choose the outsourcing mode. TPR and the whole system always benefit more from the outsourcing mode. When the reference price coefficient exceeds (falls below) a threshold, the consumer surplus and social welfare under the authorizing mode are higher (lower) than those under the outsourcing mode. If the environmental impact of unit remanufactured products relative to unit new products is higher than the consumer preference and the reference price coefficient is below the threshold, the authorizing mode is more environmentally friendly. However, as the consumer preference increases, the probability of the authorizing mode outperforming the outsourcing mode in environmental benefits decreases .