电商平台会员制下商家的平台广告策略研究

    Platform Advertising Strategy of Merchant under E-commerce Platform Membership Mechanism

    • 摘要: 为研究电商平台会员制下商家的平台广告策略,构建了商家不引入平台广告和借助电商平台会员制引入平台广告情形下的博弈模型,并采用逆向归纳法和对比分析法识别商家的平台广告策略选择机理以及平台广告策略对供应链成员决策及利润的影响。研究表明,当会员价格折扣小于某阈值或当会员价格折扣大于某阈值且佣金率小于某阈值时,商家应不引入平台广告;当会员价格折扣大于某阈值且佣金率大于某阈值时,无论是从利润最大化还是从市场占有率最大化视角,引入平台广告对商家和平台商是一种“双赢”策略。引入平台广告总是不利于非会员,当佣金率和会员价格折扣满足一定条件时有利于会员。为保证会员权益以及会员专享价格折扣产品品类的多样性,平台商应根据各品类产品不同的佣金率分类设置会员价格折扣。

       

      Abstract: In order to study the platform advertising strategy of a merchant under e-commerce platform membership mechanism, this paper establishes game models under two scenarios where the merchant does not introduce platform advertising and introduces platform advertising through e-commerce platform membership mechanism, and identifies the merchant's platform advertising strategy selection mechanism and the impact of platform advertising strategy on the decisions and profits of supply chain members by reverse induction and comparative analysis. Results show that when the member price discount is less than a certain threshold or when the member price discount is greater than a certain threshold and the commission rate is less than a certain threshold, the merchant should not introduce platform advertising; when the member price discount is greater than a certain threshold and the commission rate is greater than a certain threshold, whether from the perspective of profit maximization or market share maximization, introducing platform advertising is a "win-win" strategy for the merchant and the platform. Introducing platform advertising is always detrimental to nonmembers, and beneficial to members when the commission rate and the member price discount meet a certain condition. To ensure the rights and interests of members and the diversity of product categories with price discount exclusive to members, the platform should set member price discounts based on different commission rates for each product category.

       

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