Abstract: This paper develops a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model to examine the strategic choices of manufacturers and retailers in selling products with different levels of carbon emission reduction under a dual-channel supply chain consisting of direct sales and distribution. Results show that: 1) when consumers preference for low-carbon products and the carbon reduction level of products increase, the optimal prices for both manufacturers and the retailers increase. 2) When the carbon reduction level of products is either very low or very high, manufacturers tend to sell low-carbon products through the direct channel and distribute traditional products via the retail channel; otherwise, manufacturers sell traditional products directly and distribute low-carbon products through retailers. 3) The equilibrium sales strategy of manufacturers is always detrimental to the retailer profits. 4) A higher carbon reduction level of products is more beneficial to both manufacturers and retailers. This paper aims to provide insights for manufacturer strategies for selling carbon reduction products in a dual-channel supply chain.