Abstract: This paper develops a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model to examine the strategic choices of manufacturers and retailers in a dual-channel supply chain, where they sell different products with varying levels of carbon reduction.The results show as follows. 1) When consumers have a strong preference for low-carbon products and when the products feature higher levels of carbon emission reductions, the optimal prices set by both the manufacturer and the retailer increase. 2) When the carbon emission reduction level of the products is either very low or relatively high, the manufacturer chooses to sell products with lower carbon emissions through the direct selling channel and distributes those traditional products via the retail channel. However, when the carbon emission reduction level is moderate, the manufacturer sells traditional products through the direct selling channel and distributes lower-emission products through the retail channel. 3) The manufacturer's equilibrium sales strategy is always detrimental to the retailer's profit. 4) The higher the product's carbon emission reduction level, the more beneficial it is for both the manufacturer and the retailer.