考虑横向和纵向差异的供应商渠道入侵策略

    A Supplier Channel Encroachment Strategy Considering Horizontal and Vertical Differentiations

    • 摘要: 随着电子商务的迅猛发展,供应商入侵所引发的渠道冲突日益显著。本文研究产品质量存在横向和纵向差异的供应商渠道入侵策略问题,考虑产品质量设计成本,构建4种Stackelberg供应商入侵模型:无入侵、横向差异化入侵、纵向差异化入侵和横纵向差异化入侵;通过逆向求解法分析不同情形下各方的均衡结果及最优策略,揭示产品质量设计成本对供应商入侵策略选择的影响。结果表明,纵向、横纵向均有可能成为最优入侵策略,且入侵策略与产品质量设计成本密切相关;质量设计成本不同,入侵策略不同,但差异化入侵并不总是最优选择,供应商仅在其直销渠道利润达到某一临界值时才会选择入侵。因此,供应商应根据不同的产品质量设计成本合理制定入侵策略,在差异化入侵策略下,供应商和零售商可能会实现双赢的局面。

       

      Abstract: This study investigates the issue of supplier channel encroachment strategies with horizontal and vertical quality differentiations considering product quality design cost. Four Stackelberg models of supplier encroachment are proposed, including no encroachment, horizontal differentiation-based encroachment, vertical differentiation-based encroachment, and hybrid horizontal and vertical differentiation-based encroachment. Using backward induction, the equilibrium outcomes and optimal strategies for all participants are analyzed and derived across different scenarios, and the impact of product quality design cost on supplier encroachment strategies is examined. Results show that both the horizontal and hybrid differentiations may be the optimal strategies, with the choice of encroachment strategy highly sensitive to product quality design cost. Different levels of quality design cost lead to different strategy choices, and differentiation-based encroachment is not always the optimal. Suppliers adopt encroachment only when the profit from the direct sales channel reach a threshold. Therefore, suppliers should develop encroachment strategies according to product quality design cost. Under differentiation-based encroachment, a win-win outcome between suppliers and retailers may be achieved.

       

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