Abstract: In a two-stage supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer, the efficiency of decentralized supply chains with wholesale-price contracts are studied under four different cross-ownership structures: the non-cross-shareholding case, the unilateral-shareholding cases, and the cross-shareholding case. Both the push configuration where the manufacturer is the contract leader and the pull configuration where the retailer is the contract leader are considered. Within a newsvendor-type model framework, the first order optimality conditions are characterized, based on which the optimal order quantity, wholesale price and the supply chain efficiency are compared and impacts of the manufacturer/retailer’s shareholding ratio as well as the newsvendor ratio are investigated. Research results show that decentralized supply chain is more efficient when the contract leader holds the follower’s shares unilaterally, and vice versa. Meanwhile, the efficiency of decentralized supply chain is moderate when they are cross-shareholding. Furthermore, under the non-cross-shareholding case and the retailer’s unilateral-shareholding case, supply chain efficiency of the retailer-led pull configuration is higher than that of the manufacturer-led push configuration. In contrast, under the manufacturer’s unilateral-shareholding case and the cross-shareholding case, the manufacturer-led push configuration may outperform the retailer-led pull configuration when the manufacturer’s shareholding ratio is sufficiently high and the product’s profit margin is sufficiently low.