考虑在线人数和参考价格的直播电商动态运营策略

    Research on Dynamic Operation Strategy of Live e-Commerce Considering Online Viewers and Reference Price

    • 摘要: 直播电商作为新兴电商业态,其运营管理正逐步受到学界与业界的广泛关注,然而现有文献多集中于静态分析,而对直播电商动态运营过程缺少刻画。本文以直播电商平台、主播及厂商构成的直播电商供应链为研究对象,综合直播间平均在线人数、参考价格、转化率、商品质量商誉及主播影响力等因素构建起直播电商需求函数,基于消费者退货、平台成本分担等4种决策情境,借助微分博弈模型对直播电商供应链的动态运营过程进行刻画,对比分析了不同决策情境下的动态均衡策略和绩效水平。研究发现:1)参考价格效应及直播间平均在线人数对直播电商供应链成员的利润和相关努力均具有正向促进作用;2)消费者退货将使直播电商供应链成员蒙受较大的利润损失,若采取降低相关努力投入的策略,又将导致长期损失超过短期的节约成本;3)当直播电商平台的单位收益较高时,采取分担厂商品控成本的策略,可以实现整个直播电商供应链的帕累托改进;4)集中决策模式下的各决策变量均取得最大值,而仅当成本分担比例较高时,成本分担模式下的厂商品控努力及商品商誉才会高于集中决策模式。

       

      Abstract: Against the backdrop of economic digital transformation, live-streaming e-commerce has become a dominant channel for online shopping. As an emerging e-commerce format, its operational management has increasingly attracted attention from both academia and industry; however, existing studies mainly focus on static analyses, with limited research on the dynamic operation of live-streaming e-commerce. This paper investigates a live-streaming e-commerce supply chain composed of a platform, a streamer, and a manufacturer. By incorporating factors such as the average number of online viewers, reference price, conversion rate, product quality goodwill and streamer influence, a demand function for live-streaming e-commerce is constructed. Under four decision-making scenarios involving consumer returns and platform cost-sharing, a differential game model is employed to characterize the dynamic operational process of the live-streaming e-commerce supply chain, and the dynamic equilibrium strategies and performance levels across different scenarios are comparatively analyzed. The results indicate that: (1) both the reference price effect and the average number of online viewers positively affect the profits and effort levels of supply chain members; (2) consumer returns cause significant profit losses for supply chain members, and reducing related effort inputs may lead to long-term losses that outweigh short-term cost savings; (3) when the platform’s unit revenue is relatively high, sharing the manufacturer’s quality control costs can achieve a Pareto improvement for the entire live-streaming e-commerce supply chain; and (4) under centralized decision-making, all decision variables attain their maximum levels, whereas only when the cost-sharing ratio is sufficiently high do the manufacturer’s quality control effort and product reputation under the cost-sharing mode exceed those under the centralized decision-making mode.

       

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