Abstract: This study proposes a cost-sharing model concerning the risk cost sharing between the food delivery platform and the delivery men to tackle the food delivery loss risk, which is aimed at improving user satisfaction and stimulating the enthusiasm of delivery men. To make it clear about the risk mechanism between the food delivery platform and the delivery men, this study deploys game theory to analyze the multi-agent relationship in the market. The backward induce method is then utilized to derive the equilibrium results in terms of the optimal cost-sharing ratio, the utility of the delivery man, the profit of the food delivery platform, and total utilities. Results show that the food delivery platform can efficiently stimulate the enthusiasm of delivery men and improve the total utilities by appropriately sharing the costs related to food delivery loss risks. Furthermore, this study also finds that the results are affected by several key parameters, including the weight of the utility of the delivery man, the external risk level, the risk sensitivity parameter, the delivery time, and the product attribute. When facing high-risk or high-uncertainty scenarios, the food delivery platform is encouraged to bear more risk costs to avoid reducing the enthusiasm of delivery men. When facing middle-risk or low-risk scenarios, the platform can appropriately transfer some risk costs to formulate a win-win risk-sharing mechanism.