Abstract: Considering the situation that counterfeiters enter the E-commerce market, a supply chain game model consisting of brand owners, counterfeiters and E-commerce platforms is constructed to study the interaction mechanism between the entry of counterfeiters and the adoption of platform blockchain. The role of two information disclosure strategies of brand owners ' pricing and platform blockchain in dealing with the entry of counterfeiters is discussed, and its impact on supply chain performance and consumer surplus is analyzed. The study found that the entry of counterfeiters will damage the profits of brand owners and platforms, but may increase consumer surplus; if the platform does not use blockchain, the brand can adjust the pricing according to the proportion of ordinary consumers and the quality of counterfeit goods to disclose or hide the quality information, thus affecting the nature of counterfeit goods in the market. The improvement of the quality of non-deceptive counterfeit goods will have a positive impact on the profits of the platform and the brand; blockchain can improve the efficiency of information disclosure and the transparency of market information when the proportion of ordinary consumers is high and the quality of counterfeit products is low or moderate, and can even prevent counterfeiters from entering, so as to achieve a win-win situation among brand owners, platforms and consumer surplus. When the proportion of ordinary consumers is moderate and the quality of counterfeit products is high, the information disclosure effect of blockchain may intensify price competition, but encourage counterfeiters to enter the market.