Abstract: In the process of deep integration between the digital economy and the real economy, the influence of supply chain hierarchy on the applicability of uniform and differential licensing strategies for patented technologies is becoming increasingly significant. To address the interactive decision-making problem between supply chain hierarchy and patent technology licensing, this study constructs a supply chain game model consisting of a patent licensor, an original equipment manufacturer, and a contract manufacturer. The model investigates the mechanisms through which costs, quality, and decision-making power affect supply chain equilibrium. The model assumes that the patent licensor’s licensing strategy includes both uniform and differential licensing; the original equipment manufacturer’s production strategy involves either an in-house production approach, forming a two-tier supply chain, or collaboration with an external supplier, forming a three-tier supply chain. The cross-combination of these two types of strategies yields four decision-making scenarios. By comparing the licensing prices, output, and profits across these four scenarios, the study examines the conditions for supply chain equilibrium. The findings reveal that under specific supply chain hierarchies, total output under differential licensing equals that under uniform licensing, but social welfare differs. Differential licensing is a dominant strategy for the patent licensor, and this result holds even under a cost-plus decision-making mechanism. Under both two-tier and three-tier hierarchies, differential licensing creates a win-win situation and an equilibrium pattern for the patent licensor and the original equipment manufacturer. The decision-making mechanisms of the original equipment manufacturer and the third-tier supplier do not affect the performance of the technology licensing strategy. However, when the original equipment manufacturer assumes a leadership role in decision-making, the supply chain equilibrium changes.