基于横向公平偏好的供应链知识共享激励与监督

    A Study of Supply Chain Knowledge Sharing Incentive and Monitoring Based on Horizontal Fairness Preference

    • 摘要: 考虑成员企业公平偏好行为,并引入核心企业对成员企业的监督函数,构建双代理人情形下的供应链知识共享激励与监督模型,剖析成员企业公平偏好对供应链知识共享激励与监督效果的影响。研究结果表明:激励与监督机制对知识共享努力水平的提升具有互补性;随着核心企业监督水平的提升,产出激励系数减少,奖惩系数增加;成员企业公平偏好对供应链知识共享激励系数和供应链知识共享奖惩系数并不总是起到积极作用,但可以提升知识共享努力水平。

       

      Abstract: Based on the assumptions of fairness preference, the knowledge sharing incentive and monitoring model of supply chain with two agents is established by introducing the monitoring function. Thus an analysis is made of the influence of the fairness preference on incentive and motoring effect of knowledge sharing. Through the model building and digital simulation, conclusion is drawn as follows: incentive and monitoring can, as a complementary device, promote knowledge sharing level. The core enterprise will correspondingly increase the proportion of punishment and reduce incentive when the supervision on it is severer. The role of member enterprise fairness preference on incentive coefficient and reward and punishment coefficient are not absolutely active; however, it can improve the level of knowledge sharing.

       

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